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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the problem of the essence and mode of existence 
of the objects created by sentences found in literary works. In other 
words, it addresses the question, "Are there such things as fictional 
objects, and if so what kind of being do they possess?" It investigates 
whether the meanings of the words and sentences used to produce 
fictional objects, and these objects themselves, are real, ideal, purely 
psychic or have another distinct mode of existence; and if the latter, it 
shows that these meanings or their objects have more objectivity than 
purely imagined objects. It addresses the question of what consequences 
there are in holding various positions on the ontology of word and 
sentence meanings that are used in the creation of fictional objects. It 
also analyzes the type of logical structure and nature fictional objects 
possess, making use of insights gained from Roman Ingarden. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Topic - Fictional and Imaginary Objects 
This thesis will address the problem of the ontology of fictional 
objects. In other words, it will address the question, "Are there such 
things as fictional objects, and if so what kind of being do they 
possess?" 
Fictional objects are those types of objects that have been 
created or conceived for use in works - written or spoken - such as 
novels, plays , poems or epics. They include persons as well as a 
variety of non-personal objects ranging from Hamlet's dagger to 
Odysseus' ship. They do not include those chimerical creations which 
remain limited to our own personal imagining or dreaming - to be 
called imaginary objects - unless, of course they become used 
specifically for some literary, aesthetic, or informational purpose. All 
fictional objects originated as imaginary objects but not all imaginary 
objects become fictional objects. 
The Common Understanding of Fictional Objects 
In everyday life we talk about fictional characters (which are a 
specific type of fictional objects) as if they existed in the way our 
friends and neighbors do. People in lunch rooms can often be 
overheard discussing the sex lives of characters in their favorite soap 
opera, and students of literature often debate the psychological turmoil 
that someone like Raskalnikov is going through. Public figures at 
times even comment on the morality of characters in various sitcoms. 
We also ask each other questions about such characters. Consider, 
1 
for example, Hamlet the Prince of Denmark. We can ask: What type of 
person is he? With whom does he live? What are his likes and 
dislikes? How does he live his life? Is he concerned with improving 
himself morally? All these questions can be answered by either 
reading the play about him or talking to someone who has read it. 
Then one could know the answers or at least determine the relevance 
of these questions.1 
We have an idea as to what type of an individual Hamlet is from 
reading the play about him. Still our common understanding of Hamlet 
ts that he is just a fictional figure who does not really exist. This can 
be seen if someone started to ask questions such as, "You say Hamlet 
lives in Denmark, yet why can't I find his name in this book on the 
History of Denmark?" And we would reply that Hamlet is a literary 
figure created by Shakespeare as found in his play called Hamlet. 
Hamlet the Prince of Denmark as created by Shakespeare is not 
someone who has existed, is existing or will ever exist. 
Things We Take for Granted 
It seems, however, that there are things we never question in 
our everyday conversations about fictional characters as heard from 
academic halls to lunch rooms. We never really ask or think about 
1 There appear to be certain questions that do not make sense when 
one talks about fictional objects i.e., future occurring events in 
different contexts. For example: "Are you going to meet Hamlet?" or 
"Have you met him?" when one means precisely the fictional character. 
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questions such as, "What type of being do fictional characters have?" 
We just seem to have some foggy notion that, "No, Hamlet doesn't 
exist and yet I do think about him - I've even wondered how I would 
have acted if placed in his situation. " But how can we say that he 
doesn't exist and yet that we have thought about him? It seems that 
fictional objects like Hamlet must exist in some way, since we do talk 
and think about them. 
To Be or Not To Be 
Let us ask the question then: Do fictional objects exist in some 
way and if so what type of being do they have exactly? We say that 
Hamlet is a fictional object; but is this to say that he exists or that he 
does not exist? Do fictional objects have no being whatsoever? Or do 
they exist in our minds as some memory or idea that we call into being 
when we think of them? What are we actually talking about here? It 
does appear that we can initially make a distinction between 
something that is real such as this paper you are now reading and a 
mirage which is something that is not real and yet does have some 
type of existence or mode of being. But is a fictional object something 
just like a mirage or fantasy or dream? The answer seems to be 
negative, for there seem to be some things one is able to do with 
fictional objects, but not with dreams. One can, for instance, share 
one's novel with a friend, thereby possibly causing him/her to feel the 
same type of emotions one has experienced oneself, whereas one 
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cannot just give people some drug, for example, so that they can 
experience the same dream that one had last night. 2 
Fictional Objects Cannot Be Identified with the Collection of 
Words or Sentences Used To Describe Them 
A brief reflection upon the nature of Hamlet also makes it 
obvious that he is not the collection of words and sentences used to 
describe him because when we argue about Hamlet, we do not talk 
about those words or sentences - we talk about Hamlet, the fictional 
character, as described by those words and sentences. Furthermore, if 
he were just the collection of words and sentences used to describe 
him then it would seem that there would have to be as many Hamlets 
as there are languages that could be used to speak about him. Even 
more, if Hamlet were the collection of sentences describing him, an 
other absurdity would follow: One would be faced with the situation of 
there being as many Hamlets as there are books that had collections of 
words and sentences used to describe him (not even mentioning all the 
problems that would arise with the existence of the magnetized 
markings found in tapes and compact disks) . 
2 I can of course tell someone about my dream and so the objects of my 
dream cease to be merely imaginary objects and become fictional 
objects. This is because the contents of my dream were used to tell a 
story about my dream. Imaginary objects originating in dreams or from 
pure fancy also become fictional objects when I tell someone about 
them even if only for purely informational reasons. 
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Three Possible Solutions 
It appears that there can be three possible solutions to the 
problem of whether fictional objects possess some kind of reality, and 
if so what type. 
They Have No Being 
The first is that they have no being whatsoever. They are 
nothing - they don't exist in any way. Those who hold this position do 
so because of their presupposition that anything that can be talked 
about or referred to has to be real. This is the view of Franz Brentano 
and the later Russell, for example. (Only Russell's version of this 
theory shall be considered , though.) 
They are Purely Mental Entities 
The second view is that fictional objects are purely mental 
entities. They have a type of existence in our minds. They are mere 
objects of consciousness, mental entities whose mode of existence is 
entirely dependent upon some mind who happens to think them. If 
there were no minds, they would not exist at all. Accordingly, someone 
like Hamlet would be an idea or image that I personally have before me 
in my consciousness when I think of him or read about him. I would 
give "life" or a type of being to the fictional object by having the idea or 
image of him in my mind. (Juliusz Kleiner and E. Kucharski I believe 
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could be considered representatives of this view although actually this 
view is more a logical consequence derived from maintaining that a 
literary work is identical with the psychic experiences of an author or 
reader.) On this view, the "mode of existence" of fictional objects 
would be the same as that of merely imaginary objects (objects of my 
personal and solitary imagining or dreaming). 
They are Extra-Mental Entities 
The third view is that fictional objects are extra-mental entities. 
Naturally, they depend on the mind in some ways, but do not exist in 
the mind; rather, they transcend3 it. They are objects that go beyond 
both the written text describing them as well as the minds of those 
people who happen to read and think about them. Philosophers 
subscribing to this position hold it because of various problems 
resulting from the view that fictional objects are just mental entities. 
Roman Ingarden holds this third view. 
3 By the term "transcend" is meant something that is extra-mental but 
still mind-dependent as opposed to mind independent. This will be 
further discussed below. 
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II. THE FIRST POSSIBLE SOLUTION CONSIDERED: 
Let us now consider the first possible solution to the problem of 
whether fictional objects have being, and if so what kind of being they 
have. According to it, the answer to this question is that fictional 
objects have no being at all. This position is held, for example, by the 
later Russell, because he seems to think that otherwise, he would be 
committed to the uncomfortable position of asserting the existence of 
objects that do not exist. Russell was confronted with this problem 
when considering sentences such as, "Square circles are heavy." 
Whoever says this seems to refer to an object that is both heavy and a 
square circle. If one further assumes with the philosophers to be 
discussed here that wherever there is reference, what is referred to 
must exist, but that square circles obviously do not exist, we would 
have the apparent existence of a non-existing object. 
A "Prelude": Problems with Reference 
Those who hold the position that non-real objects do not have 
any being are led to this view because of problems they see connected 
with the assumption that reference to fictional objects (or any variety of 
imaginary or absurd or contradictory objects) occurs when talking about 
them. Therefore, we need to explain briefly what reference is and what 
it is that refers. This must be done before going into a further analysis 
of the first answer to this problem as put forth by Brentano and further 
developed by Russell. 
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What Is Reference? 
It has commonly been held by a number of philosophers starting 
with Plato and all the way up to Brentano, Russell, Quine, Strawson, 
and Searle that whenever language refers to something, that thing 
exists . 
How is it possible to make a true statement about a non-
existent object? For if a statement is to be about 
something that thing must exist, otherwise how could the 
statement mention it, or refer to it? One cannot refer to, or 
mention nothing; and if a statement cannot be about 
nothing it must always be about something. 4 
We take the word "referring" here to mean that mental act people 
perform whenever they connect language, specifically by the use of 
meanings expressed through words and propositions expressed 
through declarative sentences, with objects and states of affairs in the 
world. 
As to the question of what actually does the "referring," it is the 
meanings of words and sentences used by people to talk about objects 
or states of affairs. For example, the word "dog" has a meaning that 
refers to an object. It is the meaning of the word that refers to the 
4 Leonard Linsky, Referring (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1967), 122. 
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object; the word merely expresses the meaning. Similarly, with a 
declarative sentence such as, "It is raining outside," it is the 
proposition (i.e. the meaning of the declarative sentence) that refers; in 
this case a state of affairs is referred to. 
Is There Reference to Fictional Objects? 
Russell's Answer: No 
As mentioned, Russell states, in answer to the question of what 
type of being fictional objects have, that they have no being 
whatsoever. They appear to be objects but in fact do not exist in any 
way, and when their supposed "existence" is seen correctly one can 
show that they are really nothing at all. 5 His theory of descriptions -
also called "paraphrase theory" because, as we will see, Russell claims 
that statements about fictional objects are to be replaced by a 
paraphrase revealing the falsity of the original statements - shows 
that Russell thinks reference to be always to something that is real. If 
there is reference then of course there must be an object referred to. 
If, however, one held that there was reference to something that does 
not exist one would be placed in the paradoxical position of saying that 
an object does not exist while at the same time asserting the 
existence of that object: This would mean that one would be talking 
nonsense. 
s The early Russell did believe that non-existent objects had to have 
some type of being as this allowed one to deny they had existence. See 
Linsky, Referring, 2. 
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In response, Russell argues: When presented with an apparent 
reference to something that one knows does not exist, and an 
ascription of attributes to it, such as in, "The present King of France is 
bald," one only seems to be referring to a non-existent object; in truth, 
however, one is not. Rather, Russell asserts that the original 
statement needs to be replaced by a paraphrase and that this 
paraphrase shows the impression that one is referring to a non-
existent object to be mistaken. For the "King-of-France-example," 
Russell gives as a paraphrase, "There is one and only one present King 
of France and he is bald." This paraphrase asserts the existence of an 
actual current King of France. It is clearly the case that there is no 
present King of France and so he cannot have any attributes because 
he does not exist. Thus, the paraphrase is false. 6 Since this new 
proposition is, according to Russell, merely a paraphrase of the original 
one, and since in the case of this new proposition, there is nothing the 
proposition would refer to (which makes the proposition false), we can 
now see that in the original proposition, there is no reference to a non-
existent object either; all there is is just a false proposition. What we 
really have when there is an apparent reference to a non-existent 
object is just a false assertion claiming that an object like the present 
King of France does in fact exist, and that he has certain properties. 
6 Dr. Mark Roberts pointed out to me the fact that in this paraphrase 
there are actually two propositions. I assume he means: "There is one 
and only one present King of France." and "He is bald." I gather from 
this that it is more accurate to say the original proposition contains a 
false proposition within it. 
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According to Russell, then, all one needs to do is to analyze those 
problematic propositions carefully, express their true meaning through 
his technique of paraphrase, and then discover that they are simply 
false. 
Crittenden's Criticism of Russell 
Charles Crittenden, in his work UNREALITY: The Metaphysics of 
Fictional Objects, analyzes Russell's solution to the problem of the 
mode of existence of fictional objects. He maintains that this solution 
may be adequate when one is dealing with propositions used as 
examples in philosophical discussion, but that it is inadequate when it 
is used to deal with literary creations. In other words, Crittenden does 
not criticize Russell's example, just its application to literary figures. 
Crittenden holds that when one is presented with a sentence such as, 
"The chief cyclops lives in a cave," one understands this as a true 
statement about a character in the epic poem the Odyssey. And so, 
according to Crittenden, a more correct interpretation of the 
proposition would have it preceded by the operator, "In the Odyssey 
the chief cyclops lives in a cave." Using the paraphrasing technique of 
Russell's theory, one would restate it as, "In the Odyssey there is one 
and only one chief cyclops and he lives in a cave." It is obvious that 
the proposition, "there is one and only one chief cyclop~ and he lives in 
a cave," is false, because it asserts the existence of the cyclops. While 
Russell would agree with this, he would, however, have to hold that 
the following statement is true: "In the Odyssey there is the false 
claim that there actually exists a chief cyclops, and that he lives in a 
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cave." But as Crittenden points out, this is not the understanding we 
normally have when reading a literary work. Under the dictates of 
Russell's theory we would have to be reading it as false history or bad 
journalism. Further, we would not be able to enjoy our participation in 
the story if we viewed it in this way and so no one who has an 
understanding of literature does read or understand it in this way. 7 
Thus, according to Crittenden, all theories which attempt to 
paraphrase away expressions which make reference to fictional objects 
encounter one of two problems: 
either there is a conflict between the truth values of the 
initial sentences and their claimed paraphrases, or the 
paraphrases are about something other than what the 
initial sentences are about.8 
7 Charles Crittenden, UNREALITY The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 23-26. 
8 Ibid., 30. Applying Crittenden's view to "The chief cyclops lives in a 
cave," and the paraphrase: "There is one and only one chief cyclops and 
he lives in a cave." the first proposition would be true according to 
Crittenden and the second proposition false. Thus we show a conflict 
of truth values. The second problem also appears in the example as 
the paraphrase is about something other than what the first 
proposition is about. The first proposition says something about a 
character within a literary work whereas the second proposition says 
something about whether this character exists in actual or empirical 
reality. 
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With this, Crittenden has shown that Russell is incorrect when his 
theory of descriptions is applied to literary creations. 
Crittenden's Solution: There Is Reference to Fictional Objects, 
but Still, They Are Nothing 
Concerning Crittenden's own solution to the problem of whether 
there are such things as fictional objects, he claims to show that 
reference to fictional objects does in fact occur. In order to show this, 
he makes an important distinction. It can be seen if on the one hand, 
we consider the statement, "Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe"; and on 
the other hand statements like, "Sherlock Holmes is my favorite 
fictional detective," and "Sherlock Holmes was created by Arthur Conan 
Doyle." The first example can be verified by someone who has read a 
novel about Sherlock Holmes. It belongs to a class of statements 
which one can begin with, "in the story/novel/ myth ... " Crittenden 
calls such statements "inside" statements, and designates the content 
of the story as what makes them true or false. The latter two 
examples are statements making claims about fictional objects by 
giving them properties not found within the contents of a story but 
rather in empirical reality. And so their truth value is dependent upon 
their correspondence to empirical reality. Crittenden calls statements 
of this nature "outside" statements. 
These examples of "outside" statements clearly show that 
reference to nonexistent objects does in fact take place. For they 
cannot be paraphrased away as being just false statements affirming 
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the existence of objects which in fact do not exist. Even if Russell 
could convince us that, "The present king of France is bald," is just a 
false statement, whoever says with conviction, "Sherlock Holmes is my 
favorite fictional detective," would be dumbfounded if someone would 
try to make him believe that his assertion was false. Clearly, we are 
confronted with a true statement. Thus, since it is impossible in this 
case to explain the reference function away by unmasking the original 
statement as false, clearly, reference does in fact occur here. Thus, 
the question whether there is reference to fictional objects has been 
answered: In the case of the so-called outside statements at least, we 
are dealing also with genuine cases of reference to fictional objects. 
However, Crittenden also believes that reference occurs within a 
literary work. His analysis of the referring function of "inside 
statements" seems, however, unclear - even contradictory. For what 
he calls "inside" statements would really have to be outside ones for 
two reasons: First, as soon as one pulls a sentence out of a story and 
introduces it with the phrase, "in the story" (or with similar phrases), 
one has turned a so-called inside statement into an outside one, as 
the sentences occurring in the story do not begin with this phrase; 
rather, it is always someone outside of the story who makes the 
determination of whether or not some "object" of a so-called inside 
statement has the properties ascribed to it by comparing the statement 
to the text which exists in the real world. Second, one can have truth 
or falsity only when there is some type of correspondence between a 
belief and something outside of the belief itself, that is, a state of 
affairs objectively separated from the belief. Crittenden, however, 
seems to hold, for inside statements at least, a coherence theory of 
14 
truth as opposed to any type of correspondence theory as can be 
gleaned from his statement: "Storytellers' sentences are not used to 
make claims about independently existing states of affairs but to 
construct a fictional situation ... [S]entences appearing in the text of a 
novel have no truth value and themselves serve as criteria for the 
truth-values of assertions [statements] about the contents of the 
novel". 9 Yet Crittenden holds that inside statements have truth 
conditions but that this only occurs when one places the phrase or 
operator "in the story'' in front of the statement. The point to be made 
here is that in examining an inside statement, with its operator, such 
as "In the story, Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe," one realizes that 
the referent of the statement is not Sherlock Holmes but the actual 
text of the novel itself. This shows that reference to fictional objects 
is not made with inside statements when they have their operator 
attached to them. Thus, Crittenden's claims to the contrary not 
withstanding, on the basis of his assumptions, genuine reference to 
fictional objects seems to occur only with outside statements. 
Even though Crittenden has shown that genuine reference to 
fictional objects does in fact occur, for him, this does not entail, 
however, that these objects have being of any type which is beyond 
that of a purely conceptual or grammatical object (for Crittenden a 
grammatical object is an object of reference, an object qua referred to). 
He holds that fictional objects have their own particular status, that 
they belong to their own conceptual category. It is just an accepted 
fact that in common discourse we make reference to fictional objects 
9 Crittenden, UNREALITY , 91. 
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without giving them the status of actual tangible existence. 
Crittenden uses the examples, "Sherlock Holmes smokes a pipe," and, 
"Sherlock Holmes does not exist." 10 Here we have two sentences that 
express true propositions. This is because of the unique conceptual 
status Sherlock Holmes has. He is a fictional object so ipso facto he 
does not exist but at the same time because he is a member of the 
unique class of fictional objects we can make genuine references to 
him. This is because sentences 11 have been created by an author in 
the context of telling a story. Crittenden holds: 
and: 
Like direct objects, fictions are purely intentional, having 
no status in existence at all .... There are such objects 
solely in the sense that they have been written about and 
thereby become available for thought or reference.12 
lO This is certainly a problem for how can Sherlock Holmes not exist 
and yet it be true that he is a pipe smoker? The problem as Dr. Mark 
Roberts pointed out to me is not that properties can be given to a 
fictional object but that a proposition expressing these properties as 
attributable to a fictional object can be true. 
11 It is more correct, as we will see in later sections, to say that 
sentences and their meanings have been created by an author. 
Crittenden, however, does not make the distinction between sentences 
and their meanings. 
12 Crittenden, UNREALITY, 65. 
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Intentional objects are objects of thought, items qua 
thought about; grammatical objects are objects of 
reference, items qua referred to. An intentional object can 
fail to be a grammatical one through there failing to be a 
sentence about it. But all mere referents are intentional 
objects, for reference includes thinking of the intended 
referent.13 
Some Critical Comments on Crittenden 
Using his class of outside statements discussed earlier, 
Crittenden seems to have shown that reference to fictional literary 
figures does indeed occur. What he has not adequately shown is that 
reference does also occur with what he calls inside statements. 
Moreover, even if we were to grant him that he has shown reference to 
occur in the context of inside statements ; he still holds that fictional 
objects are nothing : As will be shown, this position seems to be 
mistaken. 
Further, when discussing the role of an author in creating a story 
Crittenden says that an author both introduces an object and calls a 
reader's attention to it and that this is a double process in which 
reference is taking place. But how can there be reference to a fictional 
object unless the object is first constructed? It is only after this 
13 Ibid., 66. Intentional objects can be looked on as being imaginary 
objects (see my earlier distinction, pagel) and grammatical objects as 
fictional objects. 
1 7 
construction that one can refer to the object . How can a sentence that 
has the function to construct a fictional world at the same time be 
making reference? That the sentences in a novel as they are being 
written out make reference to some object that is not even yet 
presented seems to be questionable at best. Moreover, if some 
fictional world is being constructed, not only does one need to ask, 
"How can there be true reference to it unless it is first described," but 
also, "How would one know whether the impressions one has had 
about the fictional world were correct until the fictional world was fully 
presented? " 
Response to Russell and Crittenden: 
Where Russell Is Correct 
Russell is correct in holding that reference must always be to 
something that exists; it is , after all, just a logical truth that if one 
were able to talk about a fictional object one would have to have 
something which is present for that discussion to take place. 
Where Russell Is Wrong 
Russell is wrong however in holding that reference does not 
occur when one is dealing with fictions. We have shown that Russell 's 
theories are not adequate responses to the problem of what type of 
being fictional objects possess. 
1 8 
Where Crittenden Is Correct 
Crittenden appears to have successfully shown that there is 
reference to fictional objects. I don't see how one can deny that 
reference to a fictional object takes place when one is presented with a 
proposition such as, "The cyclopses are the most terrifying creatures 
found in Greek literature." One may disagree and think that Proteus 
or the seven-headed Hydra are more terrifying, but the fact that such 
statements are understood and can be debated proves that reference to 
fictional objects has occurred. 
Where Crittenden Is Wrong 
Crittenden is wrong, however, in holding that there can be 
reference to non-being. The very fact that one has reference to 
"something ," in this case to a fictional object, shows that something 
must be present which is the object of one 's reference . It is not 
possible to assert that there is reference and then to say that it is to 
nothing. But this is exactly what Crittenden seems to do. 
The Failure of Non-Being as the First Solution 
Therefore, we can now see from all that we have done above in 
analyzing the ideas of Russell and Crittenden that the theory that 
fictional objects are nothing at all is false since there is reference to 
them. We do have genuine reference to fictional objects and this has 
established the fact that there are such things as fictional objects. 
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III. THE SECOND POSSIBLE SOLUTION CONSIDERED: 
Now that we've seen that fictional objects are not nothing, let us 
consider the second possible solution, namely that they are purely 
mental entities; entities that are mere objects of consciousness -
mental entities whose mode of existence is entirely dependent upon 
some mind who happens to think them. In this section I will try to 
refute this view that admits that there are fictional objects but reduces 
them to purely mind-dependent entities. One needs to make a 
distinction, however, between something being purely mind-dependent 
and something that may be mind-dependent in its initial creation, but 
subsequently also have some type of extra-mental existence. The view 
that I am addressing here is that fictional objects have no extra-
mental existence whatsoever, that they are strictly limited to being 
"correlates" of some mind experiencing them. 
This view is held by all those who adhere to psychologism. 
Psychologism is the view that everything we know or think we know is 
just a mental construct of one form or another. Accordingly, truth is to 
be established only through purely subjective elements derived from 
self-observation. One consequence of this view is that, since all 
mathematical and logical laws are ultimately seen as being mind-
dependent, so are all mathematical and logical truths. But is it really 
the case that 2+2 did not equal 4 until someone thought up the 
equation, or that the law of non-contradiction, for example, was not 
operative until Aristotle formulated it? These types of criticisms were 
effectively used by Husserl to refute psychologism in all of its forms. 
One does, however, not need to be a psychologist to hold that 
fictional objects are purely mind-dependent and have no extra-mental 
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existence whatsoever. Let us now look into the evidence against this 
thesis. 
Evidence Against this Thesis:;: 
There Is Inter-subjective Agreement 
Although fictional objects depend upon a mind for their initial 
creation, they must transcend the mind; for when people are heard 
discussing some fictional character, there can be inter-subjective 
agreement about the character, proving that fictional objects transcend 
the mind. If they were only in the mind, each person would have his or 
her own understanding which could not be communicated to other 
persons. But it is an undeniable fact that there is communication; 
therefore, a fictional object is not purely mind-dependent: If someone 
like Hamlet only existed in one's memory or imagination, how could 
there be any real agreement among people, since no one can jump into 
the mind of another to experience that object? When two people 
communicate there is some referent which is used as the common 
starting point of that communication. In the case of a fictional 
character referred to by a text (more specifically the many sentences 
which build up and define the character) we can compare our idea of 
the character with the actual description and attributes of the 
character as found in the text. The text becomes the final arbitrator 
for the correctness of our understanding. 
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Speaking about Fictional Objects Is Not Speaking about Anyone's 
Mind 
Another argument against the thesis that fictional objects are 
purely mind-dependent is that when one talks about a fictional object 
such as Hamlet one does not talk about one's own mind nor the mind 
of the person one is speaking with, nor does one talk about the mind of 
the author who originally created him (since after all he may be dead) . 
One does not study the mind and its mental actions or make reference 
to the mind and its mental actions when speaking about Hamlet . One 
does not focus attention on any mental act but rather on the subject 
under discussion, i.e . specifically Hamlet . It is, however, necessary for 
the mental act of reference to occur when one talks to another about 
Hamlet. 
Whose Mind Is the Object In? 
A third argument against the view that fictional objects are 
purely mind-dependent entities is that if fictional objects were purely 
mental entities then for any true statement made about a particular 
fictional character one would have to know whose mind one is referring 
to in determining whether the statement is true. And this is clearly 
not the case , as we can be confronted with any number of propositions 
about Hamlet without knowing whose mind created them in order to 
come to some understanding about Hamlet. 
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Multiplication of Fictional Objects? 
There is another absurdity following from making the mode of 
existence of a fictional object purely mind-dependent as opposed to 
extra-mental even though mind-dependent in the object's origin: There 
would have to be as many fictional objects as there are minds who 
think about them. Who really wants to hold that there are as many 
Hamlets as there are minds who have thought about him or who will 
think about him? Is it not the case that one can come to an 
understanding about who Hamlet is as a fictional character because we 
all have the same Hamlet in mind when talking about him or thinking 
about him? 
Therefore I think we can safely say that fictional objects cannot 
be purely mental entities. 
23 
IV. THE THIRD SOLUTION 
As we have shown, fictional objects are neither nothing, nor are 
they purely mental entities. Therefore they must have some being 
outside of the mind. But the question is, just what type of being could 
they possibly have? In this section I will show in what way fictional 
objects are extra-mental entities, mainly using the analysis and 
argumentation of Roman Ingarden. 
Ingarden has shown in his book The Literary Work of Art that in 
order to understand the type of existence a "represented object" (i.e. 
fictional object in a literary work) has, one must first understand the 
nature of the entities which create the represented object, as well as 
the type of existence which those entities have. Ingarden, therefore, 
first brings us to an understanding of the type of existence the 
meanings of words have, since they are the basic building blocks of the 
meanings of sentences which in turn allow the build-up of complexes 
of meanings of sentences which are used to create fictional worlds or 
objects in those worlds. Thus, we need to ask first, "Just what is a 
word?" Next, we need to show that words are different from meanings; 
subsequently, an analogous difference between sentences and their 
meanings needs to be pointed out, and finally, the question needs to 
be asked, "What is the mode of existence of meanings?" 
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The Nature and the Mode of Existence of Words, and 
Considerations Showing Their Difference from Their Meanings 
The mode of existence of words and of sentences into which 
words can be combined seems to be easily accounted for: Both seem to 
be real entities in the real world around us. 
A word is, after all, to be understood as a physical sign. These 
physical signs can be presented in two different ways, either as an 
audible sound or as a visible marking of some kind. But these physical 
signs are just that: signs which point to something other than what 
they themselves are. 
And what they point to are meanings. That meanings are 
different from the signs used to represent them can be shown by the 
fact that one can have many instances of the same word and yet all 
those words point to the same meaning. One can also have the same 
meaning expressed in various languages such as the meaning of the 
word "love" expressed as it is in English as well as in Latin: "amor." 
We also have the cases of those words which express the same 
meaning in a language yet are spelled and pronounced differently. 
These are the synonyms such as "hit" and "strike" as well as "peak" 
and "summit." Clearly, as we have seen in these examples, the words 
differ from each other, but the meaning is .the same, which shows an 
identification of word and meaning to be mistaken. 
A further argument in support of the difference between words 
and their meanings can be derived from the peculiar instances where 




meanings are associated with it according to the context that is used 
in a sentence. (It is only after a context is given that a particular 
meaning is actually expressed by the word.) I am thinking of those 
homonyms such as "bat" which can have the meaning of a strong solid 
stick made of wood with one end thicker or broader than the other used 
in baseball or the meaning of any variety of creatures who are the only 
mammals capable of true flight. Again, identifying the word and its 
meaning would make it impossible for the same word to have these 
totally different meanings. 
There are also such words as "bare" and "bear" which have the 
same pronunciation or word sound and yet have a different spelling and 
meaning . 
If these words were written (as in the case of the former pair) or 
spoken (as in the case of the latter pair) by themselves and not in the 
context of other words we would never be able to tell what meaning 
they have. 
Words and Communication 
Individual words are used in order to communicate our thoughts, 
not only to others, but also as a record for ourselves. It seems that in 
communicating with others we seldom use only one word. We usually 
communicate by the use of subject, verb, and object type sentences. 
An exception to this seems to be words we use for commands or 
warnings such as "Stop!" or "Fire! " But even these upon closer 
inspection reveal that they are a type of uniquely imbedded sentence 
as revealed by the fact that an exclamation point is used to express 
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urgency or admonition. Also, in order to be of any use in 
communicating some idea which would produce an action or change in 
action, these unique "words" need to be directed to some individual or 
group of individuals, such as in, "You there, in the blue shirt, Stop! a 
car is coming" or "Everyone in the theater - Fire! Get out!", although 
only the word "Stop" is spoken in the former example and "Fire" in the 
latter example. We do have the example of a word such as "Hello" 
which functions both as a word and as a sentence. (In order for this 
word to function as a sentence it has to be directed to someone and 
even though it doesn't have an exclamation point when written down 
we can tell its particular function by the fact that we capitalize the first 
letter when it is used as a sentence and we do not capitalize it when 
making reference to it as just being a word of the English language14). 
Still, ordinarily, when we communicate with others, or at least intend 
to communicate with them, we use individual words in combination 
with other words (most often explicitly but sometimes implicitly as in 
the above examples). 
Sentences and Meanings - Where or How Do Meanings Exist? 
We have seen the difference between words and their meanings; 
now we need to show the difference between sentences and their 
meanings. 
14 Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, trans. George G. Grabowicz 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 108. Ingarden 
is quoting A. Marty. 
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The difference between sentences and their meanings can be 
shown through arguments similar to those used to show that words 
are different from their meanings. For example, one can have two 
different (synonymous) sentences expressing the same meaning, such 
as, "The man is driving around in his car," and, "The man is riding 
around in his automobile." One can also have two equal sentences 
each having a different meaning depending upon the context they are 
spoken in. For example, "Please pick up that bat and give it to me," 
spoken on a baseball field has a different meaning from, "Please pick 
up that bat and give it to me," spoken in a biological research 
laboratory. Again, since different sentences can express the same 
meaning, and the same sentence can express different meanings, it is 
mistaken to identify sentences and meanings. 
Meanings appear to be able to "transcend" the words that 
express them, and so they are different from the words and word 
sounds used to express them. But where do meanings exist? In the 
minds of individuals of a particular society or somehow in the collective 
consciousness of some society or of humanity as a whole? This 
question is not addressed by lngarden but he does have an answer as 
to what type of existence meanings have. 
Meanings As Neither Real nor Ideal 
We have seen that the type of existence that words and sentences 
have is easily accounted for. We have also seen that words and 
sentences are different from their meanings. We have not yet shown, 
however, what type of existence meanings have. 
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meanings of words and sentences were ideal, the objects created or 
projected by them would also have to be ideal since they would rest on 
an ideal foundation. If meanings are ideal then the idea of someone 
like Hamlet or even Donald Duck had to have existed for all time Oust 
like the idea of a triangle) since the complex meaning units used to 
create them existed for all time and so they were just waiting to be 
discovered by some literary adventurer. This does not seem to be the 
case at all although meanings can refer to ideal objects such as the 
concept of a perfect triangle. 
If, therefore, meanings of words and sentences do not seem to be 
either real or ideal1 6 , then what type of existence do they have? We 
have shown that they are not purely psychological entities existing 
only in the minds of those who happen to think them, since we do not 
refer to the mind of the author or reader when we reflect on the 
brought into being by subjective acts of consciousness (mental acts) 
which bind various meanings to words. But the putting together of 
these meanings to form complexes of meanings is a truly creative act 
in which authors participate. However , he also seems to hold the 
position that one makes use of concepts in bringing meanings into 
being (which are like essences in that they are ideal). And one makes 
use of many slightly different meanings which reflect different aspects 
of an ideal concept in the creation of a literary work. See last section of 
this paper: Ideal Concepts Needed for Intersubjective Identity of 
Sentences. 
16 I cannot go into the question whether this holds for all meanings. It 
does, however, seem to hold for all meanings used in a literary work. 
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meaning of a word or sentence. We seem to be stuck, though, because 
of the problems involved with both possibilities referred to above; thus, 
the status of word and sentence meanings seems to remain in a sort of 
limbo between the poles of being real or ideal. 
Meanings As Intentional 
Ingarden's solution to this problem is that the meanings of 
words are purely intentional in their mode of existence. An intentional 
object is the referent of our thought. But objects of thought can be 
either simple or complex, just as meanings can be simple, as in one 
meaning expressed by a word, or complex, as in a variety of 
interdependent meanings expressed by sentences explaining or 
building up a fictional world. 
Since words are the basic building blocks used to create 
sentences, and since the objects projected by word-meanings are 
purely intentional, the objects and state of affairs projected by the 
meanings of sentences must also be purely intentional in their mode 
of existence. 
Ingarden holds that every sentence has what he calls a purely 
intentional sentence correlate. Purely intentional correlates of 
sentences are actually the states of affairs projected by the meaning 
units of the words that comprise the sentences. Meanings of words as 
well as of sentences, according to Ingarden, may be initially dependent 
upon certain mental acts for their creation in our minds. Meanings of 
words and sentences also are initially dependent upon certain other 
mental acts which must produce the physical word-representations 
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(i.e. the audible or written word); but once this has occurred, these 
meanings come to be mind-independent inter-subjective entities. This 
can readily be seen if one thinks of all the ways we have of 
communicating novels and plays such as our use of printed matter, 
laser disks, audio tapes etc. 
The meanings of words as well the meaning units of sentences 
are what one understands . A word is tied or bonded to a meaning by a 
mental act . For words are only intelligible if one understands the 
meanings that have become associated with them. It is the meanings 
of words which have the important function of projecting the objects 
they represent. Most often various meanings need to be used with 
other meanings to complete the projection of an object. For example 
the meaning of the word "dog" projects an incomplete object , as does 
the meaning of the word "black"; but when placed together we have a 
more specific projection of "black dog" although this is still incomplete 
as we do not yet know what type of dog is being referred to. However , it 
is the objects projected by individual words as well as the states of 
affairs projected by the meaning units of sentences which one focuses 
upon. The understanding of the meaning and the focusing upon the 
object occur simultaneously. Anyone can understand the meaning of 
words or sentences as long as he understands the language in which 
they are expressed. So meanings are what one uses to understand 
those entities (whether they be objects projected by single words or 
objects as components of states of affairs as well as the states of 
affairs themselves projected by sentences) that become inter-
subjectively present. 
32 
Every sentence has, according to Ingarden, an intentional 
sentence correlate, and for the declarative sentence, this correlate is 
an intentional state of affairs projected by the meaning units the 
sentence expresses. States of affairs can exist only in two ways: 
either as purely intentional or as objectively existing. Only sentences 
which express true judgments (the meanings of the sentences would 
be called propositions) have purely intentional sentence correlates that 
correspond to objectively existing states of affairs. All other purely 
intentional sentence correlates are projected by meanings and have no 
correspondence to any other objectivity. 
Types of Intentional Objects: Original Purely Intentional Objects 
and Derived Purely Intentional Objects (Also Called Fictional 
Objects) 
Ingarden distinguishes between originally purely intentional 
objects and derived purely intentional objects. 
The former are those entities created by a conscious being 
without attempting (yet) to communicate them to other conscious 
beings. These entities are strictly personal as they reside in the 
consciousness of the individual who creates them. A character I am 
thinking of for possible use in a parody of a poem I have not written yet 
would be an example of this. 
Derived purely intentional objects on the other hand are those 
entities which contain a borrowed intentionality that resides in the 
intentionality of the meaning units used to create them and only 
indirectly in the original intentionality of some conscious creator. 
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Derived purely intentional objects then are freed from the subjective 
confines of any one individual consciousness and are able to be inter-
subjectively present to any number of individuals who can then identify 
them as being identically the same. My writing out the poem I thought 
of and submitting it for publication would cause the character thought 
of to become inter-subjectively present, that is, to become a derived 
purely intentional object. 
Strictly speaking, a fictional object is a derived purely intentional 
object of a specific type.1 7 We can say that a fictional object has more 
objectivity than things that are just purely imagined. Things or people 
or places that we did imagine only exist as a referent of our past 
thoughts in our memories; unless we express those ideas in some 
physical form, e.g. write them out, what type of existence can they be 
said to have? They cannot be shared with others and so there is no 
inter-subjective reality which people can refer to and analyze. On the 
other hand, I'm sure we have all had the experience of reading some 
novel and strongly disagreeing with the actor chosen for a stage play 
about it or with the way the novel was presented in a movie. Some 
friends might have thought that the representation was done correctly 
and one can argue with them because of the objectively existing novel 
to which one can make reference. 
17 One could have any variety of derived purely intentional objects 
based on the type of object that is projected by the meaning units used 
to create them. For example one could write about mathematical 
objects, contradictory objects, historical objects etc. 
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Derived Purely Intentional Objects 
Ingarden distinguishes three aspects of a purely intentional 
object: A. its content, B. its intentional structure and C. its mode of 
existence. Since we are dealing with derived purely intentional objects 
(i.e. fictional objects) in this paper we will narrow the explanation of 
his analysis to derived purely intentional objects (except when original 
purely intentional objects need to be considered to come to a better 
understanding of intentional objects). To help make these concepts 
more understandable in explaining them let us take as an example the 
derived purely intentional object projected by the meaning of the 
expression: "a bear." To the content (A) of this object belongs: 1) the 
formal aspects of the bear, 2) the total range of material attributes 
qualifying the object as a bear while partaking of the formal aspects of 
the bear (these latter two categories, i.e. 1 and 2, can be looked upon 
as being analogous to the common distinction of an object being 
comprised of form and matter) and, 3) an existence of some sort. (This 
last category would only depend upon what type of existence was 
intended for the bear such as ideal, real, absurd, or fictitious, i.e. a 
story within a story, as when a fictional character in a novel mentions 
a bear as the subject of a fairy tale he had written.) The content of a 
derived purely intentional object has its own formal aspect as we have 
just shown but the main element of this formal aspect is that it 
functions as the carrier of the properties or features that determine 
the type of object in question. The intentional object as an intentional 
object also has its own formal aspect or structure (B) or, as Ingarden 
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also calls it, its own "carrier" of its properties. To this carrier belongs 
the fact that it has a content (the bear in question, which as we 
remember has its own form, matter and existence (even if it is only 
ultimately an intended existence)). But what also belongs to this 
carrier is the fact that the intentional object is only "something 
intended." This latter fact shows the mode of existence (C) that all 
intentional objects possess is one of a purely heteronomous existence 
no matter what the portrayed existence of its content may be (the real 
or fictitious bear in question).18 (Heteronomous in the sense of having 
a mode of existence that is "merely assigned" or "merely intended." 19) 
And so we see that intentional objects have a peculiar "double-carrier" 
or "two-sided" aspect about them. (This aspect of intentional objects 
will have important consequences for understanding the nature of 
fictional objects as will be seen later in this thesis.) The intentional 
structure of any derived purely intentional object is dependent upon 
original acts of consciousness for its creation (my thinking or writing 
about a specific "bear"), but transcends those acts and is different from 
them because the purely intentional object precisely is intentional. 
Ingarden tells us, "The purely intentional object as such is, itself, a 
'nothing' in terms of ontic autonomy ... in itself it can neither exist nor 
be capable of changing itself. "20 This is precisely because it is created 
by subjective conscious acts. He says also, "In comparison with any 
ontically autonomous object it is an 'illusion' ... that draws its illusory 
18 Ingarden, The Literary Work, 118-120. 
19 Ibid., 122 and 132. 
20 Ibid., 122. 
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existence and essence from the projecting intention (from the 
'meaning-bestowal' ... ) of the intentional act."21 I understand a 
meaning-bestowal act for Ingarden to be one in which either meaning 
is originally bonded to some word or meanings are built up through the 
combination of many different interrelated sentences. With this latter 
case, one would have meaning units which project a complex object 
such as the portrayal for example, of a particular bear with its own 
various personality traits coming to light from being in different 
situations etc. as opposed to the projection of just a simple single 
object occurring from the bonding of a meaning to a word as in the 
former instance. 
Derived Purely Intentional Sentence Correlates 
According to Ingarden "every sentence 'has' according to its own 
essence, a derived purely intentional sentence correlate."22 This also 
includes even absurd and ambiguous sentences. Just as we 
distinguished three aspects of a purely intentional object, A. its 
content, B. its intentional structure and C. its mode of existence, so 
too do we need to do the same with intentional sentence correlates. 
To help make these concepts more understandable let us take as an 
example the sentence correlates, "Is the bear brown?" and "The bear is 
brown." In the content (A) of these correlates we can distinguish: 1) 
their matter, 2) their formal structure and, 3) an existence of some 
21 Ibid., 123. 
22 Ibid., 130. 
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sort. The matter in these two examples are exactly the same if we 
hold that the same bear is being referred to in each example; however, 
their structures are different according to the types of correlates in 
question. The former example has the structure of that of a "problem" 
whereas the latter example has a structure of that of a "state of 
affairs." The ontic characterization or type of existence for our 
examples is that of "existing" for the state of affairs but only having 
the status of being "questionable" for that of the problem . The ·se 
examples of course would need to be placed within a context of some 
sort so that one knew whether an ideal bear, a real bear, or a fictitious 
bear was intended. Ingarden distinguishes the aforementioned 
structure from the structure (B) of intentional sentence correlates 
themselves which have their own "carrier" of properties and features. 
The features are that of having a content of some intended sort i.e. 
real, ideal, fictitious etc. and the feature of only having a (C) merely 
intended existence (ontically heteronomous). This shows that 
intentional sentence correlates Uust as intentional objects) have a 
peculiar "two-sided," "double-carrier" or "double property-structure'' 
aspect about them. 23 The importance of this aspect for understanding 
fictional objects will come to light in the following sections 
Necessity of Intentional Objects 
It seems obvious that if the meanings of words and sentences 
have a purely intentional mode of existence then there are many 
23 Ibid., 130-132 . 
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objects or entities that are purely intentional. As was mentioned, 
according to Ingarden, every sentence "has its own purely intentional 
correlate"; we can infer from this that any object that any speaker or 
author would focus upon, be it a person, a state of affairs, an event 
etc., has a purely intentional existence . This holds for everything 
within fiction, of course, but also in some sense for all things outside 
of fiction. Things do really exist and have their own reality and 
autonomous mind-independent (not at all depending upon a mind) 
existence. But a real object I write or think about also has an 
intentional existence, that is, it is an intentional object precisely 
because I am writing or thinking about it. Usually we are not aware of 
another object and its intentionality when writing or thinking about a 
real object. Normally, we focus upon the real object, and its 
intentional object is , as Ingarden says, "transparent." We only become 
aware of the intentional objects when we may be mistaken or unsure 
about some judgment we are making about a real object or supposed 
real person, state of affairs, event, etc. 
As was earlier pointed out, purely intentional sentence 
correlates are "two-sided." So are purely intentional objects. We made 
a distinction between their content and their intentional structure and 
mode of existence . Ingarden points out, "If one were not to do this, 
one would have to concede that purely intentional sentence correlates 
contain mutually contradictory elements ... the purely intentional 
sentence correlate as such - precisely because it is intentional -
always has one and the same heteronomous mode of existence."24 
24 Ibid., 131. 
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The content, as was pointed out earlier, can have ontic characteristics 
different from that of the purely intentional sentence correlate which is 
the purely intentional "carrier" of that content. The purely intentional 
sentence correlate as carrier can only have one mode of existence, that 
of heteronomous existence. An example of the contradiction Ingarden 
mentions that would occur if his distinction between intentional 
"carrier" and content of that carrier was not made is: It would appear 
that one was saying that an object could be both real (as in being 
created and not previously existing in space and time) and yet that it 
has just an intentional mode of existence. 
Ontically Autonomous vs. Purely Intentional 
lngarden further points out that the criteria applying to the 
contents of purely intentional states of affairs are different from those 
which apply to ontically autonomous states of affairs. For example: 1) 
the latter must satisfy all laws that would arise from the nature of the 
objects that may make up such a state of affairs; i.e. all physical, 
chemical and similar laws must be obeyed; 2) they cannot contain 
mutually exclusive material elements; 3) they must be "completely, 
unequivocally, detennined." 25 All three of these points can be violated 
by purely intentional states of affairs. But before showing that this is 
in fact the case we need to analyze the ideas of Barry Smith. Smith 
states, "Ingarden was the first to point out fictional objects possess a 
25 Ibid., 142. 
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quite peculiar double property-structure. "26 What Smith is referring to 
here is the "double-carrier" or "two-sided" structure aspect of purely 
intentional sentence correlates as found in works of literary fiction. 
" .. .Ingarden's suggestion is that we must develop a conception of 
fictional objects as radically distinct, in their property behavior, from 
real objects of the material world. "2 7 
Smith uses examples that bring out and extend what Ingarden 
talks about theoretically. Smith does not, however, fall into the same 
problems that Crittenden had with his inside/ outside distinction. 
Basing his ideas on Ingarden, Smith tells us that fictional objects are 
to be conceived as having two different types of properties: one rank of 
properties in the strict sense, the other more properly understood as 
having ascribed characteristics.28 [I take Smith to mean either ascribed 
explicitly by the text or derived by the reader from what is implicitly 
given in the text.] Smith says that two different types of statements 
can be made about fictional characters which correspond to the 
aforementioned two ranks. These statements each have what he calls 
a different kind of "truth-behavior." The first type correspond to what 
he calls A-statements. These include meta-level statements made 
about fictional characters of the type which "are to be found in critical 
and theoretical texts. (Examples would be: 'Sherlock Holmes was 
26 Barry Smith, "Ingarden vs. Meinong on the logic of Fiction," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100. 
27 Ibid., 101. 
28Jbid., 101. 
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presented in novel N as a violin-playing detective' ... )."29 These A-
statements can be unconditionally true or false and they will always 
satisfy the law of excluded middle. The second type correspond to what 
he calls B-statements. They are found within the works of fiction 
themselves, but they may also include those statements we can 
ourselves " ... within certain limits ... deduce by appealing to logical and 
scientific laws."30 The first type of B-statements (which we would only 
be able to acknowledge as correct or incorrect if we metaphorically 
interpret the predicates) such as, "Sherlock Holmes was a detective," 
would be determined correct by simply appealing to the text although 
the fictional character "Sherlock Holmes" was not a detective in the 
narrow sense of the term since only real people may be detectives. 
Smith states that B-statements unlike A-statements fail the law of 
excluded middle. To explain what Smith proposes let us analyze two B-
statements of the second type violating a logical law: "Hamlet was left-
handed" and "Hamlet was not left-handed." One discovers each 
statement to be neither correct nor incorrect although their negations, 
"It is not the case that Hamlet was left-handed" and "It is not the case 
that Hamlet was not left-handed," are also neither correct nor 
incorrect. 
Smith told us that there are other B-statements (the second 
type) which one can deduce from the B-statements (the first type) 
found within the novels themselves by appealing to logical and 
scientific laws. He does not give us an example of a scientific type but 
29 Ibid., 100. 
30 Ibid., 100. 
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I assume he must mean something like "The detective Sherlock 
Holmes cannot walk through walls" as a correct statement of this kind 
as Sherlock Holmes is presented as being a nineteenth Century 
detective living in London. And I don't know of any nineteenth Century 
detectives who had such an ability to break the laws of nature as we 
currently know them. Now Sir Arthur Conan Doyle could have easily 
given Sherlock Holmes such a characteristic but that would have 
changed the type of realistic detective stories he had written to 
supernatural or science fiction detective stories. 
As we have seen there are two types of B-statements, i.e., those 
found within the novel and those formulated after the existence of the 
former. 
We, however, can be more precise concerning what Smith 
proposes as one can actually come up with varieties of B-statements of 
different categories of the second type (not all of which necessarily fail 
the law of excluded middle.)31 Before making our distinctions let us 
call B-statements of the first type (those statements found within 
novels themselves i.e. "Sherlock Holmes was a detective.") B 1 
statements. 
Other statements which can be formulated from Bl-statements 
will be numbered sequentially. By appealing to logical laws one can 
produce a B2-statement that does not violate the law of excluded 
middle, for example: "Hamlet is left-handed or Hamlet is not left-
handed." This is an example of a disjunctive statement which is 
31 I am indebited to Dr. Fritz Wenisch for these insights into the 
varieties of possible B-statements. 
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"logically true." If we could ask Shakespeare whether this was so he 
would presumably have to say it was a correct statement. It is just a 
logical fact that, as Hamlet was portrayed, he must have been either 
left-handed or not left-handed and so the disjunctive statement must 
be correct. 
We can also come up with B3-statements that can be determined 
to be either correct or incorrect by appealing to scientific laws. For 
example, an author could be describing a scene taking place in Rhode 
Island and how it was snowing. That it was winter when the scene 
took place was never explicitly stated. If, however, someone made the 
B3-statement: "The scene from the novel took place during winter" we 
would know it to be a correct statement as opposed to the incorrect B3-
statement: "The scene from the novel took place in the summer." We 
could also produce any variety of B4-statements based upon biological 
laws as they were known by the author of some fictional work to 
determine whether they are correct or not. If, for example, we stated 
that: "Hamlet could die of AIDS" this would be an incorrect statement 
since AIDS was not around at the time of Shakespeare; however, if we 
stated: "Hamlet would be hurt if hit with a rock" one would have to 
concur that this was a correct statement. But the most interesting 
types of statements about fictional objects that can be formulated from 
Bl-statements are BS-statements that have an undetermined nature 
as to whether they are correct or incorrect . They are those types of 
statements that if they and their negations were joined in a disjunctive 
statement, the latter would have to be correct. When, however, they 
are presented alone it cannot be determined whether they are correct 
or incorrect. Two examples of BS-statements are: "Hamlet is left-
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handed" and "Hamlet is not left-handed." Both statements are of a 
totally undetermined nature. If we could ask Shakespeare: "Is Hamlet 
right-handed?" Shakespeare could possibly say: "Well, the image I 
have of Hamlet when I think of him is as being right-handed although 
I've never really thought about it until you brought up the question."3 2 
He could also say, "Well, I don't know - I have never thought of it." 
Shakespeare did not write about or portray Hamlet as being right-
handed or left-handed regardless of what Shakespeare may have had in 
mind for his character. This illustrates the peculiar "ontological 
incompleteness" that fictional objects possess. 
We have seen a variety of statements formulated from Bl-
statements but it also seems possible to me that a particular novel 
could contain a pair of B 1-statements having a contradictory nature. 
One could be presented in the first chapter with a character who is 
called left-handed. But, by the middle of the novel the character could 
be called right-handed. There are variety of reasons why this could 
occur. The first is that it was just an oversight of the author. The 
second is that it is part of the presentation of the novel itself and this 
too could be occurring for various reasons: It could be, for example, 
that some other character was mistaken or being deceitful; it could 
also be that the novel portrays some psychological or stream of 
32 One of course could have actors who portray Hamlet as being right 
handed or left handed but we are talking about the fictional character 
Hamlet as found in the play Hamlet written by Shakespeare and not 
about the actors who portray him as being one way or the other. 
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consciousness drama in which any number of contradictory type B 1-
statements would be presented. 
With the help of Smith we can now show, as was mentioned in 
the beginning of this section, how the contents of purely intentional 
states of affairs can violate the three criteria which autonomous states 
of affairs cannot violate according to Ingarden. Let us restate the 
criteria: 1) the latter must satisfy all laws that would arise from the 
nature of the objects that may make up such a state of affairs; i.e. all 
physical, chemical and similar laws must be obeyed; 2) they cannot 
contain mutually exclusive material elements; 3) they must be 
"completely, unequivocally, determined." To apply Ingarden's thesis let 
us analyze some examples of purely intentional states of affairs that 
do in fact violate Ingarden's criteria set for ontically autonomous 
states of affairs. 
1. "The cow jumped over the moon." Here we have a state of affairs 
such that the nature of the objects that make up the state of affairs 
violate the physical laws of nature. 2. "The boy picked up the round 
square." Here we have a state of affairs which contains mutually 
exclusive material elements. 3. "Hamlet was left-handed." Here is a 
state of affairs such that we do not know whether the state of affairs in 
question even applies to Hamlet because we are never told whether 
Hamlet is right-handed or left-handed. This example shows us that a 
purely intentional object is not "completely, [and] unequivocally, 
determined."33 We are often presented with characters who, while 
33 Ingarden, The Literary Work, 142. 
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being portrayed as being just like really existing people, nevertheless 
have what Ingarden refers to as "spots of indeterminacy." 34 
Thus, Ingarden has discovered that fictional objects are radically 
different from either real or ideal ontically autonomous objects. As 
was just seen, for example, real objects do not violate the law of 
excluded middle. Statements can be made about every real object such 
that it can be determined at least theoretically whether or not they 
apply to the real object. I either have some property A or I do not have 
the property in question. I am, for example, either right-handed or I 
am not right-handed. But as we saw in applying the same criterion to a 
fictional object such as Hamlet, if we say, "Hamlet is right-handed," or, 
"Hamlet is not right-handed," neither assertion is correct nor 
incorrect.35 Thus, we have a violation of the law of excluded middle. It 
is not just a matter of not knowing what property Hamlet has and that 
logically if he is supposed to be represented as a normal human being 
he would be one or the other. But rather Hamlet, as projected by the 
meaning units expressed by the words and sentences the play consists 
of is not defined in either way. 
As was previously mentioned, Roman Ingarden holds the position 
that what we call fictional objects are in reality purely intentional 
objects. He made a distinction between those objects as they are 
represented in literary works, which he calls derived purely intentional 
objects, and those objects created directly by the original creative 
34 Ibid., 246-252 and 341-342. 
35 If both were incorrect we would not have a failure of the law of 
excluded middle, but the law of non-contradiction. 
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processes of an author "from concrete acts of consciousness effected 
by an ego." 36 (Original purely intentional objects). The derived purely 
intentional objects owe their existence to various word and sentence 
meanings and because of this they "contain a borrowed 
intentionality. "37 They have of course their ultimate source of 
existence in the original intentionality of the acts of consciousness of 
some author . 
Ingarden holds that in comparison with ontically autonomous 
objects purely intentional objects are an "illusion,"38 an illusion 
however that is not based in the ontic sphere of actually existing 
autonomous objects but rather "an 'illusion' that draws its illusory 
existence and essence from the projecting intention .. . of the 
intentional act . On the other hand, the purely intentional object is not 
a complete nonentity, a nonentity which has no point of contact or 
support in any sphere of existence. 1139 
36 Ingarden, The Literary Work, 118. 
37 Ibid., p. 118 . 
38 Dr . Fritz Wenisch holds that the word "illusion " as chosen in this 
translation (unlike its German equivalent) seems questionable at this 
point in that it involves thinking that something unreal is thought of 
as real. But when reading a novel we ordinarily don't think about what 
we are reading is real. I agree to the extent that it holds before picking 
up the novel but that once we do start reading it we need to suspend 
reality in order to enjoy the novel and in a sense to step into its world. 
39 Ingarden, The Literary Work, 123 . 
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Quasi-Real Fictional World and Its Realities 
A fictional world and its objects are built up by the meanings of 
sentences of various types, i.e. state of affairs, questions, judgments, 
commands etc. and Ingarden states that "every sentence 'has,' 
according to its own essence, a derived purely intentional sentence 
correlate." 40 What this means for a state of affairs is that for every 
declarative sentence, there is a purely intentional state of affairs 
which is created by the meaning content of the sentence. But Ingarden 
holds that only "Objective states of affairs can directly correspond, ... 
to assertive propositions." 41 and further that: " ... the objects appearing 
in the purely intentional state of affairs, or the state of affairs 
themselves are characterized according to their mode of existence as, e.g., 
real, ideal, merely possible, etc., but they are not set [accepted] as 
actually existing in the ontic mode." 4 2 In other words a fictional work 
contains sentences which seemingly express truths about actually 
existing realities, but nevertheless, they are not accepted as nor are 
they ultimately intended as positing actually existing realities. Rather, 
they express realities which are only part and parcel of the world the 
work represents. " ... [T]he corresponding purely intentional states of 
affairs or objects are only regarded as really existing, without, 
figuratively speaking, being saturated with the character of reality. 
40 Ibid., 130. 
41 Ibid., 129. 
42 Ibid., 166. 
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That is why, despite the transposition into reality, the intentionally 
projected states of affairs form their own world"43 (i.e. the fictional 
world reality as presented by the novel, story or poem). 
For Ingarden, the following is an example of an action which, 
while being regarded as really existing, has only the appearance of really 
existing: 
If a sentence is spoken by a represented [fictional] character as a 
judgment directed at another represented character, then, if the 
first character is truly judging and is sincere, this sentence is 
undoubtedly a judgment in the strict sense; but at the same time 
it is a judgment that is valid or true only in the domain of the 
represented world and in regard to the objects of this world and, 
finally, only for the represented characters speaking with each 
other. And indeed this is true regardless of whether it is an 
individual and particular or a general judgment.44 
Ingarden holds that there are various criteria which allow one to 
distinguish the sentences which express actual propositions from 
those sentences which only appear to express actual propositions 
making some sort of judgment about some state of affairs. The latter 
he calls quasi-propositions and quasi-judgments as they only appear to 
be actual ones. 45 Ingarden states: " ... even sentences which have the 
form of assertive propositions can be modified in such a way that, in 
contrast to genuine 'judgments,' they make no claims of 'striking' an 
43 Ibid., 168. 
44 Ibid., 172. 
45 Ibid., 160. 
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objective state of affairs." 46 This applies to statements which appear 
in a fictional work. 
There are several criteria allowing one to distinguish actual 
propositions from quasi-propositions. Some of them are: when 
reading aloud sentences belonging to a fictional work we give them a 
different intonation than we would give to the same sentences if they 
were to appear in a scientific work. Another difference is that the title 
or subtitles of works inform us of the nature of the work in question i. 
e. whether it is a novel or scientific treatise.4 7 What is lacking with 
regard to the quasi-propositions found in a fictional work as opposed to 
the propositions found in a scientific one is that in the case of the 
former, there is no identification with the mode of the fully serious, 
there is no anchoring of their meaning contents in the actually existing 
nor is there the intention for this to happen.48 
It is this peculiar nature of quasi-propositions and quasi-
judgments and the objects they project which "allows us to plunge into 
the simulated world and live in it as a world peculiarly unreal and yet 
having the appearance of reality. 1149 
46 Ibid., 131. 
47 Ibid., 179. Ingarden proposes that one could introduce a special sign 
that one puts before quasi-judgments to distinguish them from actual 
judgments not unlike what was proposed by Bertrand Russell and his 
assertion sign currently used in symbolic logic. 
48 Ingarden, The Literary Work, 1 71. 
49 Ibid., 172. 
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Another peculiarity of quasi-propositions and quasi-judgments 
and the objects they project, i.e. derived purely intentional objects that 
are projected from the meaning units of the sentences found in 
fictional works, is for Ingarden: "Now, objects ... even though, 
according to their content, ... are usually of the nature of real 
objectivities[, t]heir ontic heteronomy, which allows them only to 
pretend real existence in their content, necessarily also brings about 
the fact that the time belonging to the represented quasi-real world is 
only an analogue of real time. 1150 This is because real time is, as 
Ingarden points out, a "continuous medium" which has no gaps in its 
occurrence in the real world (regardless of any subjective experiences 
to the contrary), whereas in fictional worlds, "only isolated 'segments' of 
'reality' ... are represented, a reality which is being represented but 
which is never representable in its flowing continuity. The reason for 
this lies precisely in the fact that the represented world [that which is 
projected by many inter-connected meaning units] has the source of its 
existence and essence solely in a finite number of sentences". 51 
Ideal Concepts Needed for Intersubjective Identity of Sentences 
As was seen earlier Ingarden does not believe that meanings of words 
or sentences have either a real or an ideal existence. He does however 
hold the position that there are such things as ideal meaning units or 
ideal concepts. An example of an ideal concept would be something 
50 Ibid., 236 . 
51 Jbid., 237. 
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that had timelessness as one of its attributes, and would therefore be 
of an absolute unchangeable nature. The idea of a perfect triangle fits 
this requirement nicely. Because of material limitations a real triangle 
could never be perfect because it is impossible for the intersecting 
lines of any triangle to match perfectly. (Of course practically speaking 
one could come up with a nearly perfect triangle.) This shows that it is 
possible for us to have the idea of a perfect entity (e.g. triangle) and yet 
we could never produce this perfect entity in actual physical reality. 
The relationship between Ingarden's ideal concepts and word 
meanings is similar to the relationship between the perfect triangle 
and the many different particular triangles of various sizes and 
different materials which are based on this perfect triangle. But first 
we need to make a distinction between word meanings and ideal 
concepts. Ingarden tells us that "it is part of the idea of meaning that 
it be bound to some word sound (or to some sign of a visual, acoustic, 
or tactile nature) and hence be its meaning .... Without the 'word 
sound' ... [meanings] could not exist at all."5 2 Ingarden holds that 
meanings are very different from ideal concepts. However, one makes 
use of ideal concepts in the creation of sentences, for "each ideal 
concept has a number of word meanings for the same object." 53 In just 
this way, one can have many different types of individual triangles, and 
yet they are all triangles. Ingarden tells us that: 
A word meaning ... is nothing other than an actualization of the 
meaning contained in the corresponding ideal, ontically 
autonomously existing concepts. Moreover, it is at any one 
52 Ibid., 59. 
53 Ibid., 87. 
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moment an actualization of only part of this meaning. This 
actualization and formation of a unified whole out of component 
parts is realized through sentence-forming operations whereby 
they immediately produce word meanings in the form in which 
they must appear as component parts of a determinate sentence 
or a determinate sentence complex. Through this actualization 
something new is undoubtedly produced: the meaning content of 
the sentences or the meaning content of a sentence complex. 
Ideal concepts are not component parts of these formations. 
They are as transcendent with respect to them as are subjective 
operations, and they are also transcendent with respect to the 
latter and remain beyond the reach of their influence. But they 
do constitute the antic basis of sentences and the regulative 
principle of their formation. In consideration of their ideal 
meaning content, the conscious subject selects appropriate 
moments in them, brings about their ontically heteronomous 
actualization, and unites them into a new whole.5 4 
I will attempt to explain what Ingarden means in the above quotation. 
The analogy of a perfect triangle and its relationship to many different 
individual triangles I think does not fully reveal the nature of meanings 
and the ideal concepts they rely on. So let us use an example more in 
line with what would be found in a literary or fictional work. Let us use 
the ideal concept of "love" and show how one only uses certain aspects 
or shades of its meaning in the writing of a play or a novel. For 
example, one uses words and sentences to create individual characters 
who express imperfect notions or only certain aspects of what it means 
to be a human being and how love of some type is expressed in their 
lives. The ideal concept of "love" itself has many meanings imbedded 
54 Ibid., 361. 
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within it and an author only pulls certain aspects out from this concept 
to use for the word to describe the specific type of love that he wants 
to portray for any one particular character. According to Ingarden each 
meaning that one produces by the subjective process of binding word 
sounds into new complete wholes is a new creation accomplished by 
the author. These sentences are new creations especially when they 
are created for the purpose of building up a fictional world. 
Ideal concepts are needed for the identity and unity of a literary 
work for: 
It is only with reference to the meaning content of ideal 
concepts that readers of a literary work can reactualize in an 
identical manner the meaning content of sentences given to 
them by the author. If there were no ideal concepts and, 
furthermore, no ideal qualities (essences) and ideas, not only 
would sentences or real and intentional objectivities be 
impossible; it would also be equally impossible to achieve 
between two conscious subjects genuine linguistic 
communication, in which both sides would apprehend an 
identical meaning content of the sentences exchanged . There 
frequently are misunderstandings between two speakers, and, 
practically speaking, they frequently cannot apprehend identically 
the same sentences. But with the existence of ideal concepts 
there is at least in principle the possibility that, by recourse to 
the corresponding objectivities and by apprehending at least part 
of the meaning content of the corresponding ideal concepts, each 
of the speakers succeeds in forming or constituting a sentence 
with a meaning content identical to the other's and hence 
understanding the sentence spoken by the other. 55 
Ideal concepts are needed, according to Ingarden, because 
without them people would not be able to communicate. When two 
55 Ibid., 364. 
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people do communicate each one knows what the other is saying 
because each person has an idea of the ideal concepts that were used 
to create the individual and particular instances of the meanings that 
participated with some aspect of their corresponding ideal concept. 
These instances of participation of words and sentences with their 
corresponding ideal concepts are specifically the meanings of the words 
and sentences used in that communication. Ingarden tells us: " ... the 
work (or the sentence) exists as soon as it is created. But it exists as 
an ontically autonomous heteronomous formation that has the source 
of its existence in the intentional acts of the creating conscious 
subject and, simultaneously, the basis of its existence in two entirely 
heterogeneous objectivities: on the one hand, in ideal concepts and 
ideal qualities (essences), and, on the other hand ... in real word 
signs."56 
Ingarden does believe that there are such things as ideal 
concepts and essences but at the same time if there were no 
conscious individuals who participated in "sentence-forming 
operations"57 then we would never have any sentences. This has 
consequences for our theories concerning the existence and type of 
being fictional objects have. For as we have seen fictional objects 
transcend and are different from the meanings used to project them 
but they are at the same time dependent upon meanings for their 
existence. They are in this way different from ideal concepts or any 
type of ideal object in that fictional objects are subject to 
56 Ibid., 361. 
57 Ibid., 102. 
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transformations by the subjective sentence-forming operations of an 
author. An author can for instance cause profound transformations to 
occur to any particular character or even to the world or universe that 
had been created. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have seen that fictional objects are those entities which are 
created by specifically original acts of consciousness. They come into 
being and exist only by our actions but they have the ability to be 
shared and become part of our lives. In this paper we have seen that 
fictional objects are not "nothing," that they do have a type of 
existence. They are not purely mind-dependent entities either, but 
rather entities that transcend the mind of any one individual person 
and yet could not exist if it were not for the peculiar nature of 
meanings and their use in our lives. 
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